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Abstract 
Understanding responses to government action is critical for developing efficient policy. In 
the context of land conservation, this paper examines whether municipal policy has a 
crowding-in or crowding-out effect on neighboring municipalities’ actions and state 
government actions. Importantly, we focus on municipal conservation referendums, which 
allow us to use a regression discontinuity framework for causal inference. Using data from 
Massachusetts and New Jersey, our findings suggest municipal conservation decisions have 
no effect on neighboring local governments’ or the state’s conservation activity.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 One of paramount roles of government is the provision of public goods. In the United 
States, there are 30,000 municipal governments, and nested on top of that are county, state, and 
federal governments. When multiple governments can provide the same or similar public good, it 
is critical to understand if governments behave strategically with respect to other governments’ 
actions. A wide variety of research focuses on how competition can cause government entities to 
react to the public good decisions of others which in turn effects the overall provisioning of 
public goods including charitable donations (Heutal 2014), public school inputs (Millimet and 
Rangaprasad 2006), and property tax rates (Bruickner and Saavedra 2001), amongst others. This 
reactionary dynamic gives rise to many questions: when a government entity provides a public 
good, how does that affect the actions of government at different levels? How might this decision 
affect the decisions of neighboring governments? Do reactions have a crowd-in effect where 
provisioning for public goods increases, or does a crowding-out effect result? 
 In this paper, we address these questions in the context of land conservation. With about 
two million acres of farm, forest, and open space land being converted to development each year 
(Cordell et al. 2014), federal, state, and local governments have established themselves as 
important agents in curbing urbanization by accounting for about half of total conservation 
easement holdings in the United States (NCED 2017). The overall production of conservation 
goals depends on, in part, the size and connectivity of conservation lands. The way governmental 
conservation agents react to the actions of other agents in land conservation decisions holds 
implications for how successful society is at protecting natural resources, supplying ecosystem 
services, providing outdoor recreational opportunities, and maintaining a representative sample 
of the full variety of biodiversity (Margules and Pressey 2000). In this paper, we test whether the 
passage of a conservation referendum in a municipality affects state level conservation activity in 
that or surrounding municipalities. We also test if there are spatial spillover effects among 
municipalities where conservation activity in one municipality influences the conservation 
activity of surrounding municipalities. 
We build a panel dataset of conservation activity of multiple agents for Massachusetts 
and New Jersey. Both Massachusetts and New Jersey have state programs – the Community 
Preservation Act and the Green Acres Program, respectively – that incentivize municipalities to 
raise money through referendums for land conservation. This makes Massachusetts and New 
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Jersey ideal places to study because of their substantial amount of conservation activity and 
available data. We collect state level conservation spending for Massachusetts from the 
Conservation Almanac and local government conservation referendum activity for 
Massachusetts and New Jersey from the Trust for Public Land, both at the municipal level. 
Since residents vote on local government conservation referendums, we utilize the 
regression discontinuity (RD) framework developed by Cellini et al. (2010) to test whether the 
relationship between conservations agents among different levels of government and across 
space are causal.1 Past studies in the conservation literature that test for spillovers of 
conservation activity typically use models that rely on correct covariate selection to produce 
unbiased results (see Albers et al. 2008 and Parker and Thurman 2011 as examples). Omission of 
key covariates in these instances may lead to results that are indicative of correlations instead of 
causal relationships. We believe we are the first to use a causal framework that controls for both 
observed and unobserved municipal characteristics to estimate conservation spillover effects that 
do not suffer from omitted variable bias. To highlight the importance of using a causal 
framework such as the dynamic RD model, we also produce cross-sectional (XS) and difference-
in-difference (DID) estimates and contrast results.  
Results from the dynamic RD framework suggest there is not a causal relationship 
between municipal level conservation and state level conservation in the municipalities that pass 
conservation referendums and neighboring municipalities. We also do not find a causal 
relationship between municipal level conservation activity among neighboring municipalities in 
both Massachusetts and New Jersey. We note there are multiple possible explanations for this 
null result and we cannot rule out possible dependencies, but we interpret these results as 
suggesting that investments made by municipalities do not have a consistent impact on neighbor 
and state agencies. There are two main implications of our findings. First, municipal actors may 
not need to be concerned about their conservation activity crowding-out state level and neighbor 
municipality conservation activity. However, they should also not expect state level and 
surrounding municipalities to crowd-in additional conservation resources in the area after 
passing a conservation referendum. Second, land conservation provisioning may be at an 
                                                          
1 Cellini et al. (2010) study how housing prices respond referendums authorizing school infrastructure spending in 
California. The dynamic RD method has been applied in a handful of papers since (e.g., Isen 2014, Martorell et al. 
2016). Lang (2018) uses the same open space referendums data in this paper and examines housing price responses 
to authorization of conservation spending.   
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efficient level where surrounding towns do not need to compete with their neighbors through the 
allocation of conservation areas in order to attract residents. Our main results differ with results 
we obtain from XS and DID estimates, which show positive and statistically significant 
crowding-in effects between local and state conservation activity, as well as neighboring 
conservation activity. We interpret these differences as evidence of bias in the XS and DID 
estimates. 
We contribute to the literature in two important ways. First, we believe we are the first to 
investigate whether the actions of conservation agents at different levels of government affect 
each other. Many papers in the public finance literature have investigated the dynamics between 
different levels of government in the context of setting consumption taxes (Besley and Rosen 
1998), income and wealth taxes (Brülhart and Jametti 2006), and funding decisions for public 
schools (Cascio et al. 2013). Prominent papers in the land conservation literature have analyzed 
the effects of public conservation activity on private conservation activity (Parker and Thurman 
2011, Albers et al. 2008, Lawley and Yang 2015). We extend this idea and test whether there is a 
reactionary dynamic between local and state governments when it comes to land conservation 
activity because such reactions can hold important implications for conservation efficiency.  
Second, we use a causal framework to investigate the relationships between conservation 
agents instead of investigating spatial correlations that previous studies have identified. 
According to the public finance literature, public good decisions by a local government may 
cause a reaction to neighboring local governments because people can choose to move to a 
community with a level of public goods that fit their preferences (Tiebout 1956) or voters may 
judge their public officials based on the tax performance of politicians in surrounding areas in 
what is referred to as a yardstick competition (Besley and Case 1995, Bordignon et al. 2003). In 
addition, spatial spillovers often result due to strategic competition between neighboring 
jurisdictions when setting property tax rates (Brueckner and Saavedra 2001), school inputs 
(Millimet and Rangaprasad 2006), and other public finances (Baicker 2005, Isen 2014). 
Similarly, studies in the land conservation literature find evidence of spatial clustering between 
conservation agents and voting outcomes (e.g., Albers and Ando 2003, Heintzelman et al. 2013, 
Altonji et al. 2016), but tend not to make causal claims either due to dataset limitations or the 
scope of the study.  
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We aim to add to the valuable insights provided by the land conservation literature by 
analyzing a novel dataset that allows us to identify conservation activity spillover effects in a 
quasi-experimental manner. In contrast to the exiting literature, we find no evidence of a positive 
spillover effect between conservation agents. 
 
2. DATA 
This section describes the four sources of data used in our analysis: 1) municipal level 
referendums and associated spending, 2) state government conservation spending, 3) land use 
characteristics, and 4) municipal demographics. 
 
2.1 Land Conservation Referendum Data  
Land conservation referendum data come from The Trust for Public Land’s LandVote 
Database (The Trust for Public Land, LandVote 2016) and spans the years 1996-2016. The data 
include proposed municipal level referendum information such as date, financial mechanism, 
total funds at stake, total funds approved, conservation funds at stake, conservation funds 
approved, as well as percentage of yes and no votes. Tables A1 and A2 in the online appendix 
show a yearly breakdown of municipal referendum activity for Massachusetts and New Jersey, 
respectively. On average, Massachusetts municipalities voted on 15 conservation related 
referendums a year, approved 10 of them, and dedicated about $28 million to conservation 
activities. Over the same time period, New Jersey municipalities experienced more conservation 
referendum activity compared to Massachusetts. They voted on an average of 23 referendums a 
year, passed 17 of them, and dedicated about $66 million to conservation activities. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the spatial distribution of Massachusetts and New Jersey municipal 
referendum activity, respectively. The top map in Figure 1 and the map in Figure 2 differentiate 
municipalities that have never passed a referendum from municipalities that have passed at least 
one referendum. Conservation referendum activity in Massachusetts seems to be primarily 
concentrated in the eastern part of the state. Though municipalities in western Massachusetts 
have also held referendums, many municipalities either never proposed a referendum or never 
passed one. Like Massachusetts, there appears to be spatial patterns of referendum activity in 
New Jersey with activity being concentrated in the northern and western part of the state. Our 
analysis will allow us to determine if the spatial clustering of conservation referendum activity is 
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caused by municipalities reacting to the conservation activity of their neighbors or is a function 
of observable and unobservable population characteristics that are spatially correlated.2  
 
2.2 State Conservation Spending Data   
Due to data availability, we are only able to observe historical state conservation 
spending at the municipal level for Massachusetts. Data on Massachusetts state conservation 
spending come from The Trust for Public Land’s Conservation Almanac (The Trust for Public 
Land, Conservation Almanac, 2016). The data include dollars spent on land conservation from 
state programs such as the Massachusetts Department of Agricultural Resources, Department of 
Conservation and Recreation, Department of Fish and Game, and others from 1998-2011.3 We 
aggregate dollar amounts by municipality by year for every year available. On average, the state 
spent about $37 million on conservation in Massachusetts municipalities (see Table A1 in the 
online appendix for a yearly breakdown).4 
The bottom map in Figure 1 shows the spatial distribution of state conservation spending 
per capita from 1998-2011 for Massachusetts. State conservation spending occurred throughout 
                                                          
2 We fundamentally view municipal referendums as discrete activities between municipalities, rather than 
coordinated. The descriptions of the ballot referendums in the Land Vote database do not indicate explicit 
coordination. In contrast, state spending (described in Section 2.2) is often coupled with other sources (e.g., US Fish 
and Wildlife, municipal funds, land trusts). However, in both cases whether or not there is a causal strategic 
response is still an empirical matter. 
3 An important assumption in our analysis is that locally raised conservation funds and state conservation spending 
can be either complements (that could crowd-in each other) or substitutes (that could crowd-out each other). If the 
types of conservation projects that each funding source typically supports are not related to each other at all, then we 
would expect to see insignificant estimation results regardless of the appropriateness of methodology used. 
Massachusetts municipalities that adopt the Conservation Preservation Act (CPA) are incentivized to fund projects 
that preserve open space, affordable housing, historical sites, and recreation. Completed projects have funded 
agricultural preservation, bike trails, fish ladders, shellfish population preservation, among many others. We believe 
these projects are related enough to what state departments like the Department of Agriculture, the Department of 
Conservation and Recreation, and the Department of Fish and Game would focus on that it is plausible to test for 
crowding-in or crowding-out activity. For a full list of CPA related projects, please visit: 
http://communitypreservation.org/projects/new. 
4 Massachusetts municipalities that adopt the Community Preservation Act (CPA) to preserve open space, affordable 
housing, and historical sites automatically receive funding from the CPA Trust Fund which disperses revenues 
collected from statewide real estate transactions each year. Inclusion of CPA Trust Fund revenues in state spending 
measurements for our models would be expected to upwardly bias the estimated relationship between local 
referendum passage and state conservation spending. We do not believe this is a concern with our dataset because, 
after multiple communications with the Trust for Public Land, it was determined that money spent from the CPA 
Trust Fund would most likely be reflected in local and not state expenditures in the Conservation Almanac dataset. 
This concern is further dispelled by the mostly negative (and insignificant) coefficient estimates from our causal 
framework models. 
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Massachusetts, with the heaviest concentration in the western part of the state and the least 
amount of activity in the eastern part of the state right before the state’s peninsula, Cape Cod.  
By comparing state conservation and referendum activity, we can get an initial assessment of 
how municipal and state conservation actions relate to one another. Referendum activity appears 
to have a few distinct pockets with a lot of activity in the entire eastern part of the state, where 
state spending is sparse, and a smaller concentration in the western part of the state right before 
the highest concentration of state spending. Visually, there seems to be a substitution effect of 
conservation vehicle where state conservation spending reacts to municipality referendum 
activity by increasing spending in municipalities that do not hold referenda or vice versa. This 
may lead to the conclusion that referendum activity crowds-out state conservation spending 
where Massachusetts conservation funds are focused on communities that may not have the 
resources or support to conserve on their own. Our main analysis allows us to investigate 
whether this relationship is causal. 
 
2.3 Land Use Data 
 Municipalities that hold referendums are matched with land cover control variables. 
Acres available in each municipality for open space is calculated using GIS and the National 
Land Cover Database (NLCD) (Homer et al., 2015). The NLCD creates a pixelated map of the 
United States, available for years 2001, 2006, and 2011, where each pixel is assigned a category 
based on land use type. We use this information to calculate the percentage of total land within 
each municipality categorized as developed open space, forests, and grasslands to proxy for acres 
available for conservation for 2001 and 2011. We then linearly interpolate available acres for 
years in between and extrapolate for years before and after 2001 and 2011.   
 
2.4 Demographic and Partisanship Data 
Finally, municipalities that hold referendums are matched with municipal level 
socioeconomic data from the 2000 Census, 2010 Census, and 2010 American Community 
Survey. We collect data on municipal level median household income, population density, 
median house price, and proportion of residents under 18, over 65, white, black, and with a 
bachelor’s degree or higher. Sociodemographic values were interpolated for years between 2000 
and 2010 and extrapolated for years before and after.  
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We use presidential election outcomes as a proxy for political ideology. For 
Massachusetts, we gathered results for each election at the municipal level between 1996 and 
2016 from the Elections Division of the Secretary of the Commonwealth. For New Jersey, the 
same data was only available between 2004 and 2016 (from the Division of Elections). With this 
data, we calculate the Democrat share deviation, which equals the share of votes the Democrat 
candidate received in a given municipality minus the statewide Democrat vote share. This 
measurement accounts for changing candidate popularity and provides a better accounting of 
changes to partisanship over time (Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 2015). As with census data, we 
interpolate Democrat share deviation for years between elections.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Outcome Variable Construction 
 To assess the effect that municipal open space conservation has on other government 
decision making, we construct and test empirical models with four different outcome variables. 
The first outcome variable is the amount of state government conservation spending per capita in 
the municipality that passed the referendum. To form this variable, we sum state level spending 
for each municipality by year and normalize it by population. The second dependent variable is 
state government spending per capita in neighboring municipalities. To form this variable, we 
calculate annual state level conservation spending per capita and then calculate a weighted 
average of all municipalities that share a border with a given municipality with weights 
proportional to the length of border in common.5 The third dependent variable is the number of 
open space referendums passed by neighboring municipalities. The last dependent variable is the 
amount of open space funding per capita approved by referendums held by neighboring 
municipalities. Both of these neighbor averages are similarly weighted by the length of the town 
borders. 
 
3.2 Dynamic Regression Discontinuity Model 
We begin with a simple model and build up to our preferred specification in order to 
build intuition. We are interested in whether municipal conservation decisions have any effect on 
                                                          
5 The intuition behind this construction is that there is more likely to be strategic behavior between municipalities 
that share a longer border. Results are qualitatively similar with different weights. 
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state and neighboring municipality conservation decisions. We observe municipality j hold an 
open space referendum, and the measure passes if the vote margin, which equals the percent 
approval minus the percent required to pass, is greater than zero, i.e., 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 = 1 if 𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗 > 0. 
We also observe our four outcome variables for government i that is linked to municipality j, 
denoted 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. Government i can be the state government or a municipality that neighbors j. A 
simple bivariate regression of the outcome on referendum passage would be: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  (1) 
Since voting outcomes are correlated with observable and unobservable municipality 
characteristics that are also likely correlated with state and neighbor actions, it is likely that ?̂?𝛽 
will be biased.  
This endogeneity problem can be mitigated by applying the RD framework originally 
proposed by Thistlethwaite and Campbell (1960) that takes advantage of the continuous nature 
of vote margin. By flexibly controlling for the vote margin, we can essentially compare 
outcomes just below the passing threshold (the control group) and just above (the treatment 
group) where both observable and unobservable characteristics of municipalities holding 
referendums are most likely very similar. Transforming Equation (1) into an RD model, we get: 
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 =  𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗 + 𝑓𝑓�𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗, 𝛾𝛾� +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  (2) 
where 𝑓𝑓(∙) is a flexible polynomial and 𝛾𝛾 signifies the corresponding parameter. We use a cubic 
polynomial of vote margin in our main analysis, but also present results with linear and quadratic 
polynomials in the online appendix as a robustness check.6  
Comparing outcomes for municipalities that are just below and just above the threshold 
results in a quasi-experiment where referendum passage is as good as randomly assigned, and the 
causal effect of referendum passage on other government conservation spending can be isolated. 
Election outcomes in an RD framework have been used to examine causal relationships between 
incumbency and election advantage in the House of Representatives (Lee 2008), electoral 
support and legislator’s voting behavior (Lee et al. 2004), political party affiliation and land use 
policies (Solé-Ollé and Viladecans-Marsal 2013), legislator partisanship on city policing and fire 
                                                          
6 Gelman and Imbens (2014) argue that high order polynomials can lead to biased inference and should be avoided. 
We chose to use a cubic polynomial in our main specification because Cellini et al. (2010) and Lang (2018) use a 
cubic specification in similar econometric setting. We admit this is ad hoc, which is why we present estimates using 
linear and quadratic polynomial specifications in the online appendix (Tables A3 and A4). Results are similar 
regardless of polynomial order choice. 
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protection expenditures (Gerber and Hopkins, 2011), and the spillover effects of incumbency in 
mixed election systems (Hainmueller and Kern 2008). 
While RD is a powerful research design for causal inference, we must further modify 
Equation (2) for this specific setting. Municipalities can and do hold more than one referendum 
over the course of our data timespan. Across all sample years, on average 37% of municipalities 
that are holding a referendum have held one in the past. If we restrict the sample to year 2006 or 
later, that proportion jumps to 55%. Given this, it is absolutely essential for the empirical model 
to control for past referendum attempts in order to not attribute crowd-in/out effects to one 
referendum when there could be multiple effects present. Following the model developed by 
Cellini et al. (2010), we implement a dynamic RD estimator that conditions treatment effects on 
other referendums a community has held. Our preferred specification is:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 +  ∑ [𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏�𝜏𝜏=0 + 𝑓𝑓�𝑚𝑚𝑃𝑃𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−𝜏𝜏,𝛾𝛾𝜏𝜏� +  𝜇𝜇𝜏𝜏𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−𝜏𝜏] +  𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 (3) 
where t indicates the year of observation, 𝜏𝜏 is the number of years since a referendum, 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−𝜏𝜏 
is a binary indicator for municipality j passing a referendum 𝜏𝜏 years prior to year t, 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝑗𝑗,𝑖𝑖−𝜏𝜏 is a 
binary indicator for municipality j holding a referendum (this acts as an intercept to separate 
municipalities that do versus do not hold referendums in a given year), 𝛼𝛼𝑗𝑗 is a municipality fixed 
effect, and 𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 is a year fixed effect. Additionally, this specification allows the polynomial in vote 
margin to vary across lagged years. By controlling for the vote margin, past referendum activity, 
and municipality and year fixed effects in Equation (3), 𝛽𝛽𝜏𝜏 no longer suffers from the 
endogeneity problem that plagued Equation (1) and is interpreted as the causal effect that passing 
a conservation referendum has on another government 𝜏𝜏 years after the referendum is passed for 
municipalities that are near the vote margin threshold. Additionally, Equation (3) models time 
paths of government responses. Conserving land parcels or placing items on the ballot is not 
immediate, and thus the effect may be delayed or heterogeneous over time.7 
 
4. REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY DIAGNOSTICS 
 The RD framework aims to replicate the identification of treatment effects from 
randomized experiments in settings where treatment is not randomly assigned. This is done by 
focusing regression analysis to observations just below and just above an arbitrary threshold 
                                                          
7 In the context of U.S. state capital tax policy, Chirinko and Wilson (2017) find that a dynamic specification is 
critical for understanding strategic responses. 
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where treatment assignment is as good as random due to the similarity of observation 
characteristics and the inability of observations to affect the treatment outcome.  
The key identifying assumption of the framework is the continuity of the conditional 
expectations of counterfactual observations below and above the threshold. This assumption may 
not be valid, however, if observations can manipulate their treatment status. Though very 
unlikely in our setting where municipalities use thousands of votes to determine the passage of a 
referendum, we can test for manipulation in a few ways. One way is to look at the density of 
observations around the threshold. If municipalities cannot manipulate their treatment status, we 
would expect a relatively smooth density of observations across the passage threshold. Another 
way is to analyze the similarity of municipality characteristics around the passage threshold. 
Municipalities can be similar in observable and unobservable ways. Although it is impossible to 
explicitly test for similarities in unobservable characteristics, we can compare observable 
municipality characteristics for municipalities that fail a referendum and municipalities that pass 
a referendum. 
 
4.1 Referendum Vote Margin Density 
 Figure 3 shows the distribution of vote margins for all referendums held in Massachusetts 
from 1996-2016 in the form of a local polynomial density estimator of observations on either 
side of the passage threshold. Evidence of strategic behavior in voting outcomes would reveal a 
statistically significant difference in the frequency of vote margins just below and just above the 
threshold of a 0% vote margin.  A visual inspection of the vote margin distribution shows an 
increase in frequency on the positive side of the threshold, but a density test for manipulation of 
the running variable proposed by Calonico et al. (2014) reveals an insignificant test statistic of 
1.105 with a p-value of 0.269. This suggests manipulation of the running variable should not be 
an issue in our identification strategy for Massachusetts. 
 Figure 3 also shows the vote margin distribution for New Jersey referendums during the 
same time period. New Jersey municipality vote margins visually do not show the same jump 
that Massachusetts has around the threshold. Any concerns of strategic behavior are further 
dismissed after the manipulation test reveals a statistically insignificant test statistic of -0.2975 
with a p-value of 0.7661. Like for Massachusetts, this suggests that manipulation of the running 
variable should not be an issue for New Jersey.  
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4.2 Sociodemographic Balance 
Table 1 presents the means and standard deviations of Massachusetts sociodemographic 
characteristics to investigate whether municipalities that have failed at least one conservation 
referendum are similar to those that have passed at least one referendum. Columns 1 and 2 show 
municipalities that have ever failed a referendum and municipalities that have ever passed a 
referendum are very similar in median income, percentage of population under the age of 18, 
percentage of population that is white, percentage of population that is black, population density, 
number of acres that are available for conservation, and median house price. Column 3 shows the 
results of a t-test between the means presented in Columns 1 and 2. There is a statistically 
significant difference between the two groups of municipalities when it comes to the percentage 
of population over the age of 65, the proportion of populations that have a bachelor’s degree or 
higher, and Democrat share deviation.  
 RD makes a comparison at the threshold, and it is most important that there is balance, 
and hence no manipulation, at that point rather than across the whole distribution. Lee and 
Lemiuex (2010) suggest a way to test this balance, which is to estimate the RD model with the 
sociodemographic variables as the dependent variables and inspect for discontinuity at the 
threshold. Since we have many covariates, we follow Lee and Lemiuex’s suggestion to perform a 
chi-squared test for the discontinuity to be zero for all covariates after running a Seemingly 
Unrelated Regression (SUR). Column (4) of Table 1 shows the results of the SUR model where 
each sociodemographic variable is a dependent variable with a dummy variable indicating a 
passed referendum and a cubic polynomial for vote margin as the independent variables. 
Individual coefficient estimates for the pass dummy variable are mostly not statistically different 
than zero, with the exception of proportion over age 65 (at the 10% level). However, a post-
estimation Chi2 test does not allow for the rejection of the null hypothesis that each of the 
coefficients are equal to zero. Together with the results of the vote margin manipulation test, we 
are comfortable proceeding with the RD framework to analyze the Massachusetts referendum 
data. 
 Table 2 repeats the same columns as in Table 1, but for New Jersey. Democrat share 
deviation is not included because those data are only available since 2004, which removes about 
one-third of the observations. Column (3) shows that there are statistically significant differences 
in means between towns that have ever failed a conservation referendum and those that have 
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ever passed a referendum in the proportion of the population under the age of 18 and median 
house price. Estimation results of the SUR model in Column (4) show a statistically significant 
discontinuity for the proportion of the population over the age of 65, but the Chi2 test shows the 
same conclusions as those for Massachusetts. This suggests we can use a RD framework to 
analyze New Jersey referendum data as well. 
 
5. RESULTS 
Table 3 shows the main results from Equation (3). Columns 1-4 present results for 
Massachusetts with each column being a different outcome variable. Across columns, almost all 
of the coefficients are not statistically different from zero, which suggests municipal referendum 
passage does not have any effect on state conservation spending, neighbor state conservation 
spending, or neighbor referendum activity in the year of the referendum and the years following. 
There is a statistically significant coefficient estimate for neighbor state spending per capita six 
years after a passed referendum, however, it is not robust to controlling for alternate vote margin 
polynomials.8 Estimates are also inconsistent throughout time with coefficient signs switching 
between positive and negative magnitudes in each model. 
Table 3 also produces the results from Equation (3) for New Jersey referendum activity. 
Consistent with the results for Massachusetts, nearly all coefficients are statistically insignificant, 
which suggests municipal referendum passage does not have a causal effect on neighbors’ 
conservation referendum activity. 
While there is no statistical evidence of strategic responses by other governments, we 
must caution against strong conclusions because our results are not precisely estimated zeros. 
Point estimates vary considerably across years and standard errors are large, meaning that within 
the bounds of what is statistically consistent with the data are economically meaningful strategic 
responses. We attempted to improve precision by including socioeconomic covariates that vary 
by year in Equation (3) and by combining data from Massachusetts and New Jersey, but neither 
are a panacea. These results are reported in the online appendix and have similar coefficient 
variation and standard errors. We proceed cautiously with the interpretation that there is no 
causal effect of municipal conservation on other governments’ actions.  
                                                          
8 Robustness results that control for linear and quadratic polynomials of vote margin are included in the online 
appendix. 
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6. TESTING THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN  
To better understand the importance of our dynamic RD modeling strategy, we also 
estimate cross-sectional (XS) and difference-in-differences (DID) models that address the same 
questions, and then we compare the results to our preferred results to assess bias in XS or DID 
models. The DID model analysis is performed on the same dataset as the dynamic RD model. 
The specification does not control for the referendum vote margin, but is otherwise identical to 
Equation (3), namely the specification still conditions on past referendum activity to account for 
municipalities that hold more than one referendum. For the XS analysis, we sum our outcome 
variables across years and the independent variable of interest is a binary indication of whether 
the municipality passed at least one conservation referendum over the whole time period. In the 
XS specification, we lose municipality fixed effects, but instead include a rich set of 
socioeconomic variables that are averaged across years. When the outcome variable measures 
actions taken in a neighboring municipality, the socioeconomic variables are averaged across 
neighbors, using the same weights (border length) as the dependent variable construction (see 
Section 3.1). Lastly, for the XS model, we include all municipalities, not just those that hold a 
referendum, though results are similar if we do not expand the sample in that way.  
 
6.1 Cross-Sectional Analysis 
 Table 4 shows the results from XS regressions for Massachusetts (columns 1-4) and New 
Jersey (columns 5-6). All models regress the outcome variable (identified at the column header) 
on an indicator for referendum passage and a suite of socioeconomic variables.  
 Columns 1 and 2 of Table 4 show the correlations between a municipality passing a 
referendum and the amount of state funded conservation that happens in that municipality and in 
neighboring municipalities. Column 1 shows a statistically insignificant positive coefficient 
between a referendum passage and state conservation spending while Column 2 shows a 
statistically significant coefficient for the relationship between a municipality passing a 
referendum and state spending in neighboring municipalities. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the conditional correlations between a municipality passing a 
referendum and the referendum activity of neighboring municipalities in Massachusetts. The 
results indicate a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the relationship between a 
municipality passing a referendum and the number of referendums their neighbors pass and the 
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total conservation funds attached to those referendums. The results are quite similar for New 
Jersey, as shown in columns 5-6.  
  
6.2 Difference-in-Differences Analysis 
 Table 5 presents regression results from the DID analysis for Massachusetts (columns 1-
4) and New Jersey (columns 5-6). Columns 1-2 of Table 5 estimate the dynamic relationship 
between passing a conservation referendum and the amount of state conservation expenditure in 
the municipality that held the referendum and neighboring municipalities. These results have 
both positive and negative coefficients, and most are insignificant. Columns 3-4 show positive 
and statistically significant coefficients in the concurrent year, as well as a lag of seven years, 
which indicates some support for a crowd-in effect for neighboring municipalities. This finding 
is bolstered and more pronounced in New Jersey (columns 5-6), which shows positive and 
statistically significant coefficients in the concurrent year through a four year lag.  
 
6.3 Comparison to the main results 
The main results using the dynamic RD indicate that no causal effect of municipal open 
space referendums on other government conservation actions. The intuitive appeal of the 
dynamic RD model is that it controls for the selection process by which municipalities decide to 
spend money on conservation, which could lead to biased inference if not controlled for. 
However, the extent of bias is an empirical question for this given setting.  
With the XS and DID models, we do not find evidence of municipal actions affecting 
state actions in the municipality that holds a referendum, the same conclusion as the dynamic 
RD. Thus, in this case, we find no evidence of bias in this setting.  
In contrast, the XS and DID models suggest that municipal actions positively affect 
neighboring state and municipal actions, whereas the dynamic RD models indicated no effect. 
We interpret these differences as evidence of bias in the XS and DID estimates. We hypothesize 
that the XS and DID results reflect spatial correlations that are not adequately captured by 
socioeconomic control variables or municipality fixed effects. Supporting this idea, the DID 
models estimate statistically significant positive effects in the concurrent year, which is most 
likely not causal given that it takes time to strategically respond.  
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7. CONCLUSION 
 We use local government conservation referendum data from Massachusetts and New 
Jersey, two states with land conservation incentive programs, as well as state government 
conservation spending data from Massachusetts, to investigate the relationship between public 
conservation agents at different levels of government and across space. Using a RD framework, 
our results suggest there is not a causal relationship between the conservation activity of local 
and state governments as well as between neighboring local governments. 
 By investigating whether there are spillover affects among public conservation agents at 
different levels of government and neighboring governments, we make two main contributions to 
the literature. First, we believe we are the first to investigate whether conservation agents in 
different layers of government react to each other. Prior literature investigates externalities 
between different levels of governments for other public goods, but not for land conservation. 
Second, our methodology allows us to investigate these relationships between public 
conservation agents in a more causal manner than what has been done in the past. 
 As urban sprawl in the United States continues to damage biodiversity and natural 
resources, communities can use land conservation as a tool to curb urban sprawl. The types of 
agents involved in conservation and how they react to each other will determine how efficient 
conservation actions will be. Our empirical setting is unique in that extensive municipal 
conservation voting allows for causal identification, however this may impact external validity. 
We choose to study two states that have state-level incentives for municipalities to take 
conservation actions. Results found here may not hold in states without these types of policies. 
One could imagine that state-level policies increase positive responses because municipalities 
face the same incentives and their state institutions see conservation as a priority. On the other 
hand, municipalities in states without conservation incentives may, in the face of scarcer 
resources, be more proactive in building off of neighbors’ actions to enhance conservation 
benefits. Future research that examines states without strong land conservation incentive 
programs or uses a causal framework to examine the relationship between public conservation 
agents and private land trusts can also aid in understanding the efficiency of land conservation 
provisioning. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1: Massachusetts Land Conservation Activity 
 
 
 
Notes: Figures show referendum and state spending activity for conservation in Massachusetts municipalities.  
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Figure 2: New Jersey Land Conservation Activity 
 
Notes: Figure shows referendum activity for land conservation in New Jersey municipalities. 
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Figure 3: Distribution of referendum voting by margin for Massachusetts and New Jersey 
 
 
 
Notes: Graphs are visualizations of manipulation tests for open space referendum vote margins in Massachusetts and 
New Jersey using a quadratic local-polynomial to construct the density point estimator and a cubic polynomial to 
construct the bias-corrected density point estimator. Solid lines are density point estimates and the shaded areas are 
95% confidence intervals. Test statistics of density discontinuity are insignificant for both states.
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Table 1: Sociodemographic Balance of Treatment and Control Groups for Massachusetts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Municipalities 
that ever fail a 
referendum 
(std. dev.) 
Municipalities 
that ever pass a 
referendum 
(std. dev.) 
 
Difference 
of means 
(t stat) 
SUR model 
difference 
(std. error) 
     
Median Income ($) 88,977 88,633 -344 -8,071 
 (24,441) (29,264) (-0.11) (5,955) 
Bachelor's Degree or more (%) 40.06 43.27 3.22* -1.941 
 (14.11) (15.21) (1.82) (3.288) 
Population Under 18 (%) 23.45 22.96 -0.49 -0.837 
 (4.16) (5.05) (-0.88) (1.017) 
Population Over 65 (%) 13.64 15.16 1.52*** 2.114* 
 (3.91) (6.02) (2.75) (1.095) 
White Population (%) 93.25 92.51 -0.74 -0.729 
 (6.73) (7.57) (-0.87) (1.583) 
Black Population (%) 1.78 1.86 0.08 0.272 
 (3.08) (2.96) (0.24) (0.653) 
Population Density 1,305 1,096 -210 -197.1 
 (2,044) (2,047) (-0.88) (446.0) 
Available Acres 8,923 8,992 68 634.3 
 (6,607) (6,830) (0.09) (1,471) 
Median House Price ($) 366,801 397,879 31,078 -17,556 
 (131,672) (171,608) (1.68) (34,321) 
Democrat Share Deviation (%) -4.80 -2.92 1.88* 1.968 
 (8.52) (9.96) (1.70) (2.044) 
     
Observations 115 203 318 318 
Number of Municipalities 96 171 267 267 
Vote Margin Polynomial    Cubic 
Chi2 Test    8.07 
Prob > Chi2       0.6215 
Notes: Demographic data is for the year the referendum was held. Values were interpolated/extrapolated from the 2000 
Census and 2010 Census or ACS, NLCD database for 2001 and 2011, and the Elections Division of the Secretary of the 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Results for Column (4) are from seemingly unrelated regressions where the error terms 
are assumed to be correlated between individual regression equations. Municipality demographics were the dependent 
variables and the exogenous explanatory variables were a dummy variable for a passed referendum and a cubic vote margin 
polynomial. Coefficient estimates for the pass dummy variable are shown. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 2: Sociodemographic Balance of Treatment and Control Groups for New Jersey 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Municipalities 
that ever fail a 
referendum 
(std. dev.) 
Municipalities 
that ever pass 
a referendum 
(std. dev.) 
 
Difference 
of means 
(t stat) 
SUR model 
estimated 
difference 
(std. error) 
     
Median Income ($) 105,423 106,291 868 -1,371 
 (31,480) (29,697) (0.26) (6,059) 
Bachelor's Degree or more (%) 39.79 40.56 0.77 -0.312 
 (15.19) (16.23) (0.43) (3.212) 
Population Under 18 (%) 24.47 25.23 0.77* 0.813 
 (3.65) (4.09) (1.73) (0.791) 
Population Over 65 (%) 14.42 13.47 -0.95 -2.448** 
 (4.77) (6.22) (-1.45) (1.192) 
White Population (%) 85.61 87.24 1.63 -0.320 
 (10.31) (12.10) (1.25) (2.345) 
Black Population (%) 4.24 4.59 0.35 1.870 
 (5.81) (7.94) (0.42) (1.492) 
Population Density 1,968 1,802 -166 65.60 
 (1,838) (2,830) (-0.57) (530.0) 
Available Acres 7,765 7,965 201 2,178 
 (8,963) (8,000) (0.22) (1,647) 
Median House Price ($) 440,913 379,184 -61,730*** -35,759 
 (235,050) (193,801) (-2.73) (41,022) 
     
Observations 105 357 462 462 
Number of Municipalities 77 235 312 312 
Vote Margin Polynomial    Cubic 
Chi2 Test    9.53 
Prob > Chi2       0.3897 
Notes: Demographic data is for the year the referendum was held. Values were interpolated/extrapolated from the 
2000 Census and 2010 Census or ACS, NLCD database for 2001 and 2011. Results for Column (4) are from 
seemingly unrelated regressions where the error terms are assumed to be correlated between individual regression 
equations. Municipality demographics were the dependent variables and the exogenous explanatory variables were a 
dummy variable for a passed referendum and a cubic vote margin polynomial. Coefficient estimates for the pass 
dummy variable are shown. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 3: The Effect of Passing a Conservation Referendum on Own and Neighbor State Spending and 
Neighbor Referendum Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Massachusetts  New Jersey 
VARIABLES 
State 
Spending 
per capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
State 
Spending 
per capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
Refs 
Passed 
per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log)  
Neighbor 
Refs 
Passed 
per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log) 
                
Pass Concurrent Year 0.258 -0.839 0.013 -0.343  0.040 0.091 
 (0.455) (0.547) (0.060) (0.547)  (0.054) (0.669) 
Pass 1 Year Ago 0.631 0.363 -0.023 0.175  -0.031 -0.946* 
 (0.644) (0.512) (0.042) (0.451)  (0.040) (0.560) 
Pass 2 Years Ago -0.113 0.092 0.005 -0.042  -0.061 -0.344 
 (0.525) (0.382) (0.026) (0.323)  (0.040) (0.559) 
Pass 3 Years Ago 0.349 -0.183 0.023 0.005  -0.010 -0.287 
 (0.416) (0.470) (0.048) (0.598)  (0.035) (0.525) 
Pass 4 Years Ago 0.081 0.036 0.011 0.390  -0.024 -0.080 
 (0.482) (0.491) (0.035) (0.439)  (0.025) (0.463) 
Pass 5 Years Ago 0.004 -0.432 0.007 0.065  -0.029 -0.352 
 (0.852) (0.624) (0.031) (0.446)  (0.023) (0.378) 
Pass 6 Years Ago -0.087 1.224*** 0.049 0.287  -0.017 -0.293 
 (0.456) (0.442) (0.042) (0.441)  (0.028) (0.410) 
Pass 7 Years Ago -0.369 0.950 -0.053 -0.211  0.005 0.109 
 (0.660) (0.724) (0.055) (0.517)  (0.022) (0.370) 
        
Observations 3,220 3,220 4,830 4,830  5,565 5,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.251 0.375 0.212 0.159  0.134 0.172 
Vote Margin Polynomial Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic  Cubic Cubic 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at 
the town level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Cross-sectional Relationship between Passing a Conservation Referendum with Own and 
Neighbor State Spending and Referendum Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Massachusetts  New Jersey 
VARIABLES 
State 
Spending 
per 
Capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
State 
Spending 
per capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
Refs 
Passed 
per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log)   
Neighbor 
Refs 
Passed 
per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log) 
        
Passed a Referendum 0.168 0.406** 0.265*** 0.553***  0.159*** 0.674*** 
 (0.230) (0.175) (0.039) (0.156)  (0.049) (0.161) 
Demographics        
Median Income (log) 0.631 0.168 -0.931*** -1.325  0.720*** 3.541*** 
 (0.986) (1.206) (0.267) (1.074)  (0.268) (0.878) 
Bachelor's Degree or Higher 
(%) 0.012 0.031* 0.016*** 0.041**  0.008 0.040** 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.004) (0.016)  (0.005) (0.018) 
Under 18 Years Old (%) -0.101** -0.260*** -0.025* -0.058  0.008 -0.037 
 (0.042) (0.058) (0.013) (0.052)  (0.014) (0.045) 
Over 65 Years Old (%) 0.006 -0.085** 0.032*** 0.033  0.015** 0.027 
 (0.033) (0.038) (0.008) (0.034)  (0.007) (0.024) 
White Population (%) 0.013 0.021 0.006 0.047  0.011** -0.001 
 (0.027) (0.039) (0.009) (0.035)  (0.005) (0.016) 
Black Population (%) 0.073 0.028 -0.008 -0.002  -0.001 0.014 
 (0.054) (0.071) (0.016) (0.063)  (0.005) (0.017) 
Population Density (log) -0.827*** 0.000 0.135*** 0.519***  -0.047 0.268** 
 (0.106) (0.134) (0.030) (0.120)  (0.034) (0.110) 
Acres Available (log) 0.000*** 1.058*** 0.173*** 0.762***  0.155*** 0.645*** 
 (0.000) (0.187) (0.041) (0.167)  (0.027) (0.089) 
Median House Price (log) -1.134* -0.494 0.593*** 2.500***  -0.002 -1.319** 
 (0.590) (0.559) (0.124) (0.498)  (0.180) (0.589) 
Democratic Vote Margin -0.021 -0.085*** -0.023*** -0.016  0.023*** -0.001 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.004) (0.018)  (0.006) (0.020) 
        
Observations 349 349 349 349  565 565 
R-squared 0.495 0.357 0.564 0.466  0.399 0.459 
Years 
1998-
2011 
1998-
2011 
1996-
2016 
1996-
2016  
1996-
2016 
1996-
2016 
Municipality Characteristics Own Avg Nbr Avg Nbr Avg Nbr   Avg Nbr Avg Nbr 
Notes: Each column is a separate regression where the independent variables include a dummy variable 
indicating whether a municipality passed at least one referendum and municipality or neighbor demographic 
variables. "Own" demographic characteristics are the demographic variables for the municipality that holds a 
referendum averaged over the years indicated. "Average neighbor" demographic characteristics are the average 
of demographics variables of towns that border the municipality that holds a referendum, weighted by border 
length. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. 
 
27 
 
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences Estimates of the Effect of Passing a Conservation Referendum on 
Own and Neighbor State Spending and Neighbor Referendum Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Massachusetts  New Jersey 
VARIABLES 
State 
Spending 
per capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
State 
Spending 
per capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
Refs 
Passed 
per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log)  
Neighbor 
Refs 
Passed 
per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log) 
                
Pass Concurrent Year -0.072 -0.117 0.165*** 1.097***  0.039*** 0.425*** 
 (0.110) (0.103) (0.027) (0.197)  (0.010) (0.109) 
Pass 1 Year Ago 0.087 0.150 0.011 0.237**  0.018** 0.305*** 
 (0.127) (0.119) (0.010) (0.106)  (0.009) (0.108) 
Pass 2 Years Ago 0.135 -0.099 0.005 0.113  0.020** 0.427*** 
 (0.122) (0.106) (0.007) (0.101)  (0.008) (0.097) 
Pass 3 Years Ago -0.062 -0.088 0.002 0.092  0.020** 0.350*** 
 (0.112) (0.097) (0.009) (0.115)  (0.008) (0.104) 
Pass 4 Years Ago 0.098 0.066 -0.001 0.127  0.005 0.133 
 (0.136) (0.115) (0.008) (0.100)  (0.007) (0.090) 
Pass 5 Years Ago 0.040 -0.043 -0.004 -0.036  -0.003 0.020 
 (0.119) (0.118) (0.006) (0.075)  (0.006) (0.094) 
Pass 6 Years Ago -0.189* 0.058 0.009 0.047  0.006 0.115 
 (0.101) (0.108) (0.008) (0.087)  (0.006) (0.085) 
Pass 7 Years Ago 0.077 -0.013 0.066*** 0.475***  0.002 0.117 
 (0.158) (0.126) (0.014) (0.106)  (0.006) (0.089) 
        
Observations 3,220 3,220 4,830 4,830  5,565 5,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.256 0.371 0.176 0.145  0.138 0.175 
Vote Margin Polynomial None None None None  None None 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the 
town level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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ONLINE APPENDIX 
(not for publication) 
 
This appendix provides supplemental figures, statistics, and results to our main paper. 
 Studies that use RD in their analysis typically present RD plots that fit separate lines to 
the relationship between a running variable, such as vote margin, and the dependent variable in 
question below and above a threshold to show the discontinuity in the outcome variable that 
results from treatment. While this is a good practice to build intuition for interpreting statistically 
estimated results, it is harder to do in our situation where a dynamic framework would call for 
multiple plots across time. The use of municipality and year fixed effects in our model further 
complicates the visualization of the relationships we estimate in one graph. Regardless, we 
present RD plots which are more akin to cross-sectional results than dynamic results for 
Massachusetts and New Jersey referendums that were held in the previous year in Figure A1.   
Figure A1 shows regression discontinuity plots for state conservation spending per capita, 
neighbor state conservation spending per capita, neighbor conservation referendums passed per 
neighbor, and neighbor conservation funds approved per capita for Massachusetts and New 
Jersey. Dependent variables are grouped into 2% vote margin bins. The visualized relationships 
are not directly comparable with the coefficients we estimate from Equation (3) in the main 
paper due to the inability to present dynamic results and control for municipality and year fixed 
effects. The small discontinuities between municipalities that barely fail a referendum and those 
that barely pass a referendum for most of the dependent variables are consistent with our 
estimations for Massachusetts. The plots for New Jersey seem to show consistent discontinuities 
between treated and untreated municipalities which suggests treatment may affect neighboring 
municipality conservation activity which is not consistent with our New Jersey estimations. 
 Tables A1 and A2 show the yearly breakdown of aggregate local conservation 
referendum activity and state conservation spending activity where available for Massachusetts 
and New Jersey, respectively. These tables show the prevalence of conservation activity in each 
state from 1996-2016 for referendums and 1998-2011 for state conservation spending. 
 Table A3 serves as a robustness check to Table 3 in the main paper by controlling for 
different vote margin polynomials for Massachusetts. In general, these regressions confirm the 
insignificant results found with a cubic polynomial. The regressions that use a linear polynomial 
of vote margin show positive and significant crowding-in results for neighboring conservation 
activity 1-2 years after a passed referendum, but this result is not robust to controlling for 
quadratic and cubic vote margin polynomials. 
 Table A4 serves as a robustness check to Table 3 in the main paper by controlling for 
different vote margin polynomials for New Jersey. Controlling for linear and quadratic vote 
margin polynomials do not reveal any statistically significant results other than a significant 
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coefficient for neighbor referendums passed two years after at the 10% level. This estimate is not 
robust to controlling for linear and cubic vote margin polynomials, however. 
 Table A5 serves as a robustness check to Table 3 in the main text by including town level 
sociodemographic variables in the dynamic regression discontinuity model. Sociodemographic 
variables add explanatory power to the model with significant coefficient estimates, however, 
coefficient estimates for the dynamic effect of passing a referendum remain insignificant. 
 Table A6 serves as a final robustness check to Table 3 in the main text by pooling 
together referendum activity in Massachusetts and New Jersey. Standard errors are slightly lower 
for pooled coefficient estimates compared to individual state results, however, coefficient 
estimates are still statistically insignificant and inconsistent throughout time. 
 
30 
 
Figure A1 
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Table A1: Referendum and State Spending Conservation Statistics for 
Massachusetts 
Year 
Referendums 
Held 
Referendums 
Passed 
Conservation 
Funds 
Approved 
State 
Spending 
1996 1 0 $0 - 
1997 5 5 $18,398,000 - 
1998 18 17 $101,431,459 $4,758,851 
1999 0 0 $0 $54,716,714 
2000 3 3 $17,415,000 $43,344,154 
2001 67 35 $109,830,772 $51,897,637 
2002 46 22 $47,546,162 $74,827,403 
2003 6 4 $6,395,006 $12,779,610 
2004 18 17 $48,858,902 $13,997,265 
2005 31 28 $94,592,119 $27,484,753 
2006 36 18 $30,629,839 $43,118,496 
2007 17 11 $23,677,068 $35,980,955 
2008 21 14 $15,425,933 $47,758,589 
2009 4 2 $2,747,987 $45,240,840 
2010 7 6 $9,404,884 $42,221,711 
2011 4 3 $1,417,860 $21,985,087 
2012 11 7 $28,113,508 - 
2013 2 0 $0 - 
2014 13 6 $19,154,148 - 
2015 4 3 $12,499,016 - 
2016 4 2 $2,309,939 - 
Average 15 10 $28,087,981 $37,150,862 
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Table A2: Referendum and State Spending 
Conservation Statistics for New Jersey 
Year 
Referendums 
Held 
Referendums 
Passed 
Conservation 
Funds 
Approved 
1996 7 6 $54,383,998 
1997 8 6 $28,882,368 
1998 55 46 $234,091,328 
1999 38 36 $116,858,202 
2000 43 42 $168,405,307 
2001 49 43 $115,493,091 
2002 30 24 $123,695,970 
2003 37 28 $98,943,898 
2004 40 29 $64,091,930 
2005 29 20 $45,275,606 
2006 23 14 $39,362,914 
2007 24 11 $82,538,428 
2008 21 13 $37,753,200 
2009 7 2 $3,404,981 
2010 5 3 $1,724,147 
2011 8 4 $10,162,888 
2012 9 7 $68,695,485 
2013 8 6 $28,094,534 
2014 2 1 $2,616,721 
2015 3 3 $2,053,726 
2016 16 13 $50,149,292 
Average 22 17 $65,556,096 
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Table A3: Robustness Check of the Effect of Passing a Conservation Referendum on Neighbor Referendum Activity in Massachusetts 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
State 
Spending 
per 
Capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
State 
Spending per 
capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
Referendums 
Passed per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved per 
capita 
(log) 
State 
Spending 
per 
Capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
State 
Spending per 
capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
Referendums 
Passed per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved per 
capita 
(log) 
                  
Pass Concurrent Year 0.175 -0.214 0.040 0.147 0.152 -0.542 0.098* 0.292 
 (0.275) (0.291) (0.035) (0.319) (0.352) (0.412) (0.050) (0.434) 
Pass 1 Year Ago 0.102 -0.132 0.040* 0.691*** 0.482 0.444 0.000 0.331 
 (0.312) (0.298) (0.023) (0.245) (0.456) (0.424) (0.032) (0.347) 
Pass 2 Years Ago -0.096 0.007 0.047*** 0.538*** -0.248 0.029 0.004 0.082 
 (0.306) (0.223) (0.016) (0.201) (0.440) (0.315) (0.021) (0.256) 
Pass 3 Years Ago -0.072 -0.219 0.042* 0.364 0.259 -0.007 0.016 -0.013 
 (0.266) (0.237) (0.022) (0.292) (0.343) (0.372) (0.035) (0.455) 
Pass 4 Years Ago 0.008 -0.337 0.019 0.312 -0.139 -0.009 -0.001 0.160 
 (0.286) (0.297) (0.023) (0.286) (0.405) (0.404) (0.027) (0.377) 
Pass 5 Years Ago -0.268 -0.419 -0.006 -0.217 -0.050 -0.367 -0.014 -0.197 
 (0.395) (0.356) (0.022) (0.263) (0.627) (0.510) (0.025) (0.338) 
Pass 6 Years Ago -0.206 0.078 0.022 0.196 0.110 0.411 0.040 0.378 
 (0.317) (0.305) (0.023) (0.246) (0.436) (0.350) (0.033) (0.354) 
Pass 7 Years Ago 0.154 0.291 0.025 0.283 0.481 0.762 -0.040 -0.088 
 (0.375) (0.367) (0.034) (0.279) (0.530) (0.536) (0.047) (0.396) 
         
Observations 3,220 3,220 4,830 4,830 3,220 3,220 4,830 4,830 
Adjusted R-squared 0.252 0.373 0.201 0.156 0.251 0.375 0.205 0.156 
Vote Margin Polynomial Linear Linear Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic Quadratic 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the municipality level. *, **, and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A4: Robustness Check of the Effect of Passing a Conservation Referendum on 
Neighbor Referendum Activity in New Jersey 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES 
Neighbor 
Referendums 
Passed per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log) 
Neighbor 
Referendums 
Passed per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log) 
          
Pass Concurrent Year 0.022 0.353 0.041 0.401 
 (0.027) (0.313) (0.041) (0.500) 
Pass 1 Year Ago 0.015 0.038 -0.019 -0.500 
 (0.025) (0.332) (0.032) (0.449) 
Pass 2 Years Ago -0.013 0.152 -0.053* -0.316 
 (0.023) (0.297) (0.030) (0.421) 
Pass 3 Years Ago -0.005 -0.023 -0.024 -0.371 
 (0.018) (0.263) (0.025) (0.402) 
Pass 4 Years Ago -0.003 0.110 -0.009 0.078 
 (0.017) (0.242) (0.020) (0.357) 
Pass 5 Years Ago -0.001 -0.077 -0.016 -0.224 
 (0.016) (0.257) (0.019) (0.297) 
Pass 6 Years Ago -0.017 -0.162 -0.019 -0.347 
 (0.017) (0.236) (0.021) (0.306) 
Pass 7 Years Ago 0.016 0.165 -0.008 -0.136 
 (0.015) (0.244) (0.018) (0.293) 
     
Observations 5,565 5,565 5,565 5,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.137 0.174 0.136 0.174 
Vote Margin Polynomial Linear Linear Quadratic Quadratic 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the 
municipality level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A5: The Effect of Passing a Conservation Referendum and Demographics on Own and Neighbor State Spending and 
Neighbor Referendum Activity 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
 Massachusetts  New Jersey 
VARIABLES 
State 
Spending per 
capita (log) 
Neighbor 
State 
Spending per 
capita (log) 
Neighbor 
Referendums 
Passed per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved 
per capita 
(log)  
Neighbor 
Referendums 
Passed per 
neighbor 
Neighbor 
Funds 
Approved per 
capita (log) 
                
Pass Concurrent Year 0.297 -0.835 0.011 -0.394  0.038 0.048 
 (0.450) (0.548) (0.060) (0.544)  (0.054) (0.658) 
Pass 1 Year Ago 0.658 0.347 -0.027 0.094  -0.036 -1.010* 
 (0.655) (0.513) (0.042) (0.450)  (0.040) (0.563) 
Pass 2 Years Ago -0.109 0.050 -0.001 -0.140  -0.064 -0.396 
 (0.535) (0.390) (0.026) (0.319)  (0.040) (0.561) 
Pass 3 Years Ago 0.346 -0.241 0.017 -0.093  -0.012 -0.320 
 (0.423) (0.469) (0.049) (0.594)  (0.035) (0.525) 
Pass 4 Years Ago 0.060 -0.062 0.006 0.301  -0.024 -0.088 
 (0.483) (0.497) (0.034) (0.432)  (0.025) (0.461) 
Pass 5 Years Ago -0.068 -0.555 0.002 -0.017  -0.028 -0.346 
 (0.865) (0.621) (0.031) (0.446)  (0.022) (0.367) 
Pass 6 Years Ago -0.150 1.121** 0.043 0.196  -0.014 -0.274 
 (0.458) (0.446) (0.042) (0.441)  (0.027) (0.400) 
Pass 7 Years Ago -0.425 0.803 -0.058 -0.279  0.010 0.154 
 (0.662) (0.698) (0.056) (0.511)  (0.021) (0.357) 
Demographics        
Median Household Income (log) -0.715 -2.410*** 0.043 0.805*  -0.090* -0.553 
 (0.690) (0.878) (0.044) (0.475)  (0.049) (0.679) 
Bachelor's Degree or Higher (%) 0.027 0.050* -0.002* -0.007  0.002 0.027 
 (0.019) (0.029) (0.001) (0.011)  (0.002) (0.024) 
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Table A5: (Continued) 
Under 18 Years Old (%) -0.019 -0.075 -0.004** -0.073***  -0.002 -0.034 
 (0.044) (0.071) (0.002) (0.021)  (0.002) (0.033) 
Over 65 Years Old (%) -0.025 -0.040 -0.010*** -0.128***  -0.008*** -0.103*** 
 (0.039) (0.054) (0.002) (0.021)  (0.002) (0.027) 
White Population (%) 0.025 0.027 0.004*** 0.063***  0.001 0.009 
 (0.026) (0.044) (0.002) (0.016)  (0.001) (0.019) 
Black Population (%) -0.005 -0.001 0.005 0.049  -0.005** -0.053* 
 (0.054) (0.066) (0.003) (0.033)  (0.002) (0.029) 
Population Density (log) -0.274 -0.261 0.070 -0.479  -0.108** -1.129* 
 (1.123) (1.866) (0.059) (0.608)  (0.045) (0.649) 
Acres Available (log) 0.000 3.141 -0.249*** -4.237***  -0.158** -2.310** 
 (0.000) (2.152) (0.086) (1.152)  (0.077) (1.087) 
Median House Price (log) 1.369*** 1.000* -0.038 0.171  0.006 0.143 
 (0.521) (0.599) (0.026) (0.259)  (0.023) (0.348) 
Democratic Vote Margin 0.023** 0.031*** 0.001** 0.020***    
 (0.009) (0.011) (0.000) (0.005)    
        
Observations 3,220 3,220 4,830 4,830  5,565 5,565 
Adjusted R-squared 0.253 0.380 0.217 0.168  0.142 0.181 
Vote Margin Polynomial Cubic Cubic Cubic Cubic  Cubic Cubic 
Municipality Characteristics Own Avg Neighbor Avg Neighbor Avg Neighbor  Avg Neighbor Avg Neighbor 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Standard errors are shown in parentheses and are clustered at the town level. *, **, and 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Table A6: The Effect of Passing a Conservation Referendum on 
Neighbor Referendum Activity 
 (1) (2) 
 Massachusetts and New Jersey 
VARIABLES 
Neighbor 
Referendums 
Passed per neighbor 
Neighbor Funds 
Approved per capita 
(log) 
      
Pass Concurrent Year 0.020 -0.054 
 (0.039) (0.404) 
Pass 1 Year Ago -0.017 -0.300 
 (0.027) (0.365) 
Pass 2 Years Ago -0.028 -0.239 
 (0.026) (0.338) 
Pass 3 Years Ago 0.005 -0.145 
 (0.027) (0.360) 
Pass 4 Years Ago -0.001 0.216 
 (0.020) (0.305) 
Pass 5 Years Ago -0.012 -0.101 
 (0.017) (0.262) 
Pass 6 Years Ago 0.008 -0.095 
 (0.022) (0.269) 
Pass 7 Years Ago -0.015 -0.057 
 (0.025) (0.287) 
   
Observations 10,395 10,395 
Adjusted R-squared 0.134 0.130 
Vote Margin Polynomial Cubic Cubic 
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Municipality Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Notes: Each column is a separate regression. Standard errors are shown in parentheses 
and are clustered at the town level. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
 
